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I. Introduction
There is a negative correlation between economic growth and volatility that has been
accepted by a burgeoning body of literature centered on growth decoding. Among the first
researchers who raised concerns about the correlation, Ramey and Ramey (1995) estimate that
one standard-deviation increase in growth variability translates into a reduction of 0.21
percentage points in per capita GDP growth using a cross-national analysis. The strong and
negative association was again confirmed and further examined in subsequent studies like
Aghion et al. (2005) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) with different empirical methods.
The volatility of economic progress, not just the speed thereof, has caught the attention of
economists due to the adverse effects it might have on investment and output through producing
mixed signals about the future of an economy. That said, in the context of developing countries,
the negative consequences of economic fluctuations can extend even beyond investment and
output falls. While it is true that the developing world is more prone to volatility compared to its
industrialized counterpart, a tendency that has been documented in a number of studies 1, what is
more important is that, given the prevalence of poverty in low and middle-income countries,
their populations are extremely vulnerable to economic uncertainty. As pointed out by Aizenman
and Pinto (2005), poor people usually do not have much access to financial markets and
therefore are presented with limited options, if at all, to diversify their sources of income. On top
of that, they rely to a great extent on public services for the most essential needs, such as
education and health care. The provision of these resources, however, is profoundly procyclical
in less developed economies, resulting in significant welfare damages to be endured by the poor,
some of which cannot be reversed, during times of economic fluctuations. Therefore, in terms of
welfare, obtaining positive growth rates is not enough. The growth itself has to be sustained, so
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See Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000), Koren and Terenyo (2007), and Loayza et al. (2007)
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that certainty is established and investment in human capital can take place without interruptions.
With this in mind, I set out to explore the causes of economic fluctuations happening along the
growth paths of developing economies. Assessing data from 86 countries pertaining to low and
middle-income categories for the period 1997-2019, I find that the most important determinants
of growth variations in the poorest countries in the dataset are access to credit in financial
markets, the size of government spending, fluctuations in agricultural productivity growth, and
the strength of governing institutions, particularly with respect to rule of law. For the developing
economies at higher income levels, volatility is strongly correlated with productivity fluctuations
in the industrial and service sectors, in addition to its positive correlation with the size of the
agricultural sector. Noteworthily, the results of this study imply that much of the empirical
ambiguity presented by the current literature on economic volatility can be resolved by taking
into account the discrepancies between different stages of development, even within the group of
developing countries alone.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical
framework of economic volatility. Section III reviews the related literature that informs the
choice of explanatory variables examined in this study. In section IV, I am going to provide a
description of the sample and introduce the methodological approach employed to investigate the
research question. Empirical findings are summarized in section V. Finally, before the
concluding remarks, I am going to discuss some policy implications as well as the limitations
faced by this study, which are also the avenues future research can explore.
II. Theoretical framework
For the most part of the twentieth century, economic volatility was examined through the
lenses of the Keynesian and the classical views of business cycles. Output and employment
volatility, according to Keynes, is brought about by fluctuations in aggregate demand whose
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three main components are household consumption, government spending, and business
investment. Keynes placed a special interest in the last component. He argued that investment
decisions are driven by one’s perceptions about future profits, which in turn are determined by
speculations about an unknown future. As a result, investment decisions sometimes “have no
foundation in circumstances,” and investors facing uncertainty have no choice but to “take their
cues from the beliefs of others […] and [are] continually buffeted by ‘the news’” (Coddington,
1976). When there is a discrepancy between expected and real profits with the expected being
higher, investors would quickly withdraw from further investment commitments. Meanwhile,
when real returns exceed their expectation, investors often display overoptimism and, as a result,
invest more than they should. Swings in investment, on a large scale, are what Keynes believed
to result in fluctuations that have crippling effects on various aspects of an economy.
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory, which was developed out of the classical school of
economics, offers a very different explanation of economic fluctuations. Rejecting the role of
aggregate demand in directing business cycles, RBC theorists put forth models in which
volatility is explained by exogenous shocks leading to productivity disturbances. A positive
shock, such as the adoption of labor-augmenting equipment, enhances the marginal productivity
of workers, making them more desirable to firms. As a result, more workers are hired, and the
economy expands with higher levels of employment and output. In contrast, negative shocks like
the spikes in oil prices in the 1970s would hurt labor and capital productivity. What follows are
lower levels of employment and output. Different from the Keynesian belief, RBC theory holds
that government interventions are largely ineffective (Eichenbaum, 1991). Efforts to stimulate a
troubled economy through expansionary fiscal policy, for example, only lead businesses and
households to form an expectation that taxes will rise in the future, to which they might respond
by cutting today’s investment and spending. Total output, therefore, remains unchanged even if
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the government has intervened. With regard to empirical evidence, Kydland and Prescott (1982)
examine total factor productivity in the U.S during the postwar period and detect a significant
correlation between technological disturbances and output growth volatility, a finding that
enhances the support for real business cycle theory. Galí (1999), in contrast, finds a significant
portion of business cycle fluctuations in the U.S between 1948 and 1994 to be accounted for by
demand shocks, substantiating the Keynesian theory.
To this day, there is no end to the debate over whether it is the Keynesian view or RBC
theory that explains the reality of economic variance better. Both theoretical perspectives,
therefore, jointly serve as the foundation for conversations about volatility. However, from the
perspective of policymakers, it would not be enough to narrow down the primary source of
economic volatility to either investment uncertainty or productivity shocks. This is because
investment uncertainty has been known to stem from a variety of sources, such as changes in a
country’s political climate, terms-of-trade fluctuations in global markets, or whether access to
funding sources is available during difficulty times. Similarly, labor productivity can be
promoted through various channels, including encouraging tertiary education enrollment,
building a robust healthcare system, or adopting labor-augmenting technologies. Given the
limited resources a developing country has to invest, it would be more useful to know that
specific aspects of the economy that would be most likely to generate the desired stability if
looked after. This quandary further motivates the research question put forth in this study.
In the following section, I am going to review existing evidence on factors that have been
found to importantly explain growth variability.
III. Existing Literature
This paper is related to three strands of literature on economic volatility. The first one
considers the effect of trade liberalization on economic fluctuations in the domestic market. The
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second looks into financial policy. The last strand of literature is concerned with the role of
political institutions in managing variance in economic performance.
3.1 Trade liberalization
With regard to economic stability, there are three reasons why engaging in international
trade can be desirable for a developing country. First, trade offers access to markets that are
larger and often more stable than the domestic markets. Down (2007) estimates the levels of
domestic volatility in OECD countries between 1952 and 2000 and finds that, in all the countries
studied, the magnitude of domestic volatility exceeded that of fluctuations in global markets. The
explanation provided by Down (2007) is that global markets are made up of many business
cycles not operating in synchronization at all times. As a result, even when part of the world is
going through a recession, the downside effect of that recession can be offset by consumption
expansion in another corner of the globe.
The second reason why countries can achieve greater stability with trade is that trade
allows for the opportunity to diversify production baskets and, thus, dilute risks specific to a
trade partner or product. For developing countries, diversification could mean transitioning from
relying primarily on commodities that are subject to high price volatility to producing
manufactured goods that are more stable in prices. McIntyre et al. (2018), in examining the
correlation between economic diversification and output volatility in small states, find the
magnitude of volatility to be smaller in countries that have well-diversified export baskets.
Finally, exposure to global markets offers an opportunity for developing countries to
become beneficiaries of technology and knowledge transferred from abroad. According to Hoppe
(2005), two channels are involved in this process. First, by opening up its domestic economy to
the world, a country can import machinery that directly and immediately improves production
capacity. The second channel operates in accordance with the observation that market integration
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has been accompanied by a geographical shift of production from developed to developing
countries, allowing less developed economies to participate in global value chains and become
more attractive in the eyes of foreign investors (Hoppe, 2005). The newly-formed business
relationships represent sources of knowledge that a labor force can absorb to enhance its
knowledge and skill base. Choudhri and Hakura (2000), using a multi-sectoral framework
applied to 10 sectors and 44 economies, empirically show that in medium- and fast-growing
manufacturing sectors, more import competition is correlated with higher productivity growth.
Given productivity fluctuations have been treated by RBC theorists as the central explanation for
business cycles, the constant improvement thereof, propelled by international trade, can be
reasonably expected to reduce macroeconomic volatility.
Despite arguments and evidence that suggest trade openness can be conducive to stable
growth, numerous studies have reported a positive correlation between trade liberalization and
fluctuations in output and consumption (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; Easterly, Islam, and
Stiglitz, 2000; Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Razin, Sadka, and Coury, 2003). The problem with
trade lies along several lines.
First, as a larger portion of an economy depends on global demand, the economy itself
becomes more vulnerable to external shocks that it can do nothing to control. Fluctuations in
terms of trade are among the external shocks that worry policymakers the most when it comes to
the impact of trade on economic stability. Prices in global markets are set without regard to the
domestic costs of production. Therefore, when prices are low and so are profits, domestic firms
have no choice but to cut back on investment, which exacerbates the state of an economy.
Conversely, when exporting is lucrative, wages and prices will rise in exported sectors. If this
rise is followed by orresponding price surges in non-tradable sectors, the result would be higher
inflation economy-wide (Cameron, 1978). Trade openness, therefore, can inject volatility into a
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country’s growth trajectory by exposing the domestic market to terms-of-trade swings. This
argument is empirically supported by Mallick (2013) who, studying a sample of 79 countries
between 1980 and 2004, discovers that fluctuations in terms of trade worsen both business cycle
volatility and long-run growth volatility. Meanwhile, Mendoza (1995), applying cross-sectional
analysis to a mixed group of 30 developed and developing countries, estimates that 45 to 60
percent of output variability in the studied countries can be attributable to terms-of-trade shocks.
The second problem with trade is that buying and selling goods and services on the
global scale, as suggested by the Ricardian model of comparative advantage, would give rise to a
more specialized production structure, which in turn is suggestive of risks being concentrated
among a small basket of goods and thus more volatility (Brainaird and Cooper, 1968; Ruffin,
1974). This is exactly what was found in Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008). Documenting trade
and production patterns in 61 countries for over 30 years, the researchers report a positive link
between trade liberalization and production specialization in which a one standard-deviation
increase in trade openness raises the concentration index by 0.54 standard deviations. The study
further finds that though trade can reduce volatility by shielding the traded sectors from the
impact of domestic fluctuations, the aggregate effect is still a positive correlation with higher
volatility as a result of greater specialization and exposure to global shocks in sectors that are
open to trade. However, not all evidence points towards the same direction. Caselli et al. (2019)
find that reducing barriers to trade, though leading to more sectoral specialization, gives rise to a
higher degree of economy-wide diversification. Taken together, the net impact is a lower level of
output volatility.
Overall, there is little consensus among the existing literature as to what the effect of
trade liberalization on economic volatility is. More importantly, the conundrum does not appear
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to only exist within the scope of the relationship between trade and volatility but extends to the
effect that trade has on production patterns.
3.2 Financial institutions
There are two aspects of a financial system that studies on macroeconomic volatility have
been particularly interested in: how developed it is and how connected it is to international
capital markets.
According to Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), economic fluctuations are a result of
the separation between investors and savers, which tends to be wider in underdeveloped financial
systems. An important source of the separation, as argued by the researchers, is originated in the
problem of asymmetric information, which is considered among the oldest and the most
important riddles in the financial world. Asymmetric information arises in the first place because
borrowers usually have more information than lenders about the feasibility and profitability of
the projects they invest in. Consequently, there exists a cost of screening associated with the
process of issuing a loan, and a cost of monitoring incurred after the loan is issued to ensure that
borrowers are committed to their repayment duty. If the informational gap is sufficiently wide,
which would result in hefty costs of borrowing, no one from either side would engage in lendingborrowing activities. A well-functioning financial system with an extensive network of financial
intermediaries overcomes this problem by evaluating risks with economies of scale and
diversifying risks over a large pool of investment projects. Moreover, financial intermediaries
like banks possess extensive knowledge of some borrowers with their access to the borrowers’
history of transactions - the type of information that is extremely valuable in mitigating
informational gaps but not widely shared with the public (Davis, 1994). Antzoulatos, Tsoumas,
and Kyriazis (2008) show that, for a sample of 22 developed and developing economies between
1990 and 2004, there is a negative correlation between the level of financial development and the
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degree of market uncertainty as revealed by movements of the FTSE and MSCI indices. With
regard to volatility, models developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) all predict that output fluctuations would be greater when high levels of asymmetric
information hinder a financial system from allocating its resources effectively. Denizer, Ayigun,
and Owen (2000) also confirm the negative relationship between financial development and
variability in consumption, investment, and most relevant to this paper, per capita GDP growth.
However, not all studies concerning the role of financial institutions agree on the
aforementioned relationship between financial development and economic volatility. Assessing
evidence from 72 countries with data aggregated from 1960 to 1997, Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz
(2000) observe that the depth of a financial system, as measured by the ratio of private credit to
GDP, affects per capita GDP growth in a nonlinear way. For emerging markets, the study
suggests that a deeper financial system would enhance stability. In contrast, the financial sector
in a developed country where the pool of credit is too large compared to the size of the economy
would magnify shocks. Berkes, Panizza, and Arcand (2012) call this phenomenon “too much
finance.” The explanation provided by Rajan (2005) is that the abundance of credit supply
observed in developed financial systems is often a result of the intense competition between
banks and non-bank firms as credit providers, which takes place on top of the existence of an
incentive system where salaries of financial workers are directly tied to the profits they can
generate. Each financial worker, therefore, is highly motivated to engage in risky investments,
especially those with tail risks, not only because of the expected high returns but also because
this type of risks can be easily hidden in most times. However, when the risks can no longer be
contained, the results, of which the financial crisis in 2008 is an epitome, can be catastrophic.
What is significant about the theory of “too much finance” is that it may very well apply
to countries with immature financial systems by a similar mechanism. The main constraint,
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regardless whether it concerns developing or industrialized economies, lies in how much risk an
economy can tolerate before going bust. With the limited capacity of regulatory agencies in
developing economies to keep potential risks in check, especially in the face of a strong credit
expansion, the answer is not much. Sahay et al. (2015), examining a sample of 128 countries
over the 1980-2010 period, empirically show that the pace of financial deepening and GDP
growth volatility are positively correlated. Wynne (2002) explains that during a lending boom,
banks have to come into contact with newly established projects and borrowers of whom they
have neither working history nor knowledge. The problem of asymmetric information is thus
more serious in the mid-stage of development when credit provision is undergoing rapid
expansion. Related to this line of thought, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) propose a model in
which it is shown that when more “unknown borrowers” enter credit markets to seek funding, the
profit-maximizing response for each bank would be to relax its lending standards, which helps
bring about a larger market share for the bank but at the same time deteriorates the quality of its
investment portfolio.
Besides the level of financial development, financial integration, or how open a domestic
market is to capital flows from abroad, has also been widely studied by the literature on finance.
For the past few decades, foreign capital has become increasingly important to developing
economies as it fuels economic growth and plays a vital role in poverty eradication in these
places. According to Prasad et al. (2005), there are three components of international capital
flows: bank borrowing, portfolio investment, and foreign direct investment (FDI), with the first
two usually being more volatile than the last. Theoretically, capital inflows from abroad can help
reduce macroeconomic volatility by providing additional funding to domestic projects, making
demand and supply for credit less cyclical. On top of that, better access to global financial
markets allows the burden of risks to be shared between domestic and foreign investors, which
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attenuates the magnitude of shocks. Finally, capital inflows, especially in the form of FDI, often
carry along technological and knowledge transfers (Prasad et al., 2005). This helps improve a
country’s production capacity and supports the transition away from volatility-prone industries.
Empirical evidence, however, provides a more complicated picture regarding the impact of
financial integration. Studies like Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) and Razin and Rose (1992)
find no significant link between financial openness and output volatility. Differently, it is
emphasized in Gavin and Hausmann (1996) that a surge in foreign capital flows may give rise to
a lending boom, which puts a strain on supervisory institutions and banks’ screening capacity.
Thus, the expected result is a more unstable economy. In contrast, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad
(2006), Calderon et al. (2005), and Haddad et al. (2012) find evidence pointing towards a
negative correlation between financial openness and the volatility of output.
Briefly speaking, the correlation between economic volatility and finance, whether in
terms of the stage of development or the level of integration, cannot be easily determined without
considering the role of regulations. The challenge for regulatory institutions with regard to
financial policy is to keep a financial system’s exposure to risk at the right amount, not too little
that would curtail growth, but not too much that would threaten the sustainability of credit
supply.
3.3. Political Institutions
Aside from the regulatory decisions that have been argued to importantly determine the
ways in which financial liberalization affects economic variability, there are two other
dimensions of a governing body that have caught the attention of economists when it comes to
understanding the causes of macroeconomic volatility: the size of government spending and the
strength of the institutions in place.
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The linkage between government size and economic fluctuations lies at the core of the
compensation hypothesis, which suggests that an extensive welfare state exists to compensate for
the greater degree of shocks a country encounters after opening to global markets (Berg, 2019).
One of the earliest discussions on the role of the welfare state was provided by Lindbeck (1975).
The researcher argues that a generous welfare system contributes to macroeconomic stability in
the short term by enacting tax schemes and social insurance programs that help smooth out
aggregate demand. However, Lindbeck also acknowledged that the impact can go the other way
around when too much government spending spurs the need for public sector borrowing, which
implies that interest rates will be higher in the future, adding uncertainty to a struggling
economy. This phenomenon is often called the crowding-out effect. Existing evidence seems to
favor the latter correlation between the government sector and economic stability. For instance,
Ramey and Ramey (1995), examining a subgroup containing only OECD countries in their
sample, find that government spending volatility and output volatility are positively correlated.
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006), studying a group of countries undergoing financial
liberalization, find a large government sector to be one of the contributors to variations in
consumption growth.
However, the impact of institutional arrangements extends beyond government spending.
In his 1999 paper, Rodrik proposes a model in which the growth differential is a function of
external shocks, latent social conflicts, and institutional strength, defined as the ability of
political institutions to keep conflicts under control. By “latent social conflict,” Rodrik (1999)
refers to the wealth gap, ethnic disparities, and geographical divisions. Meanwhile, the
institutional strength encompasses multiple aspects of a government, including how democratic it
is, whether there is prevalent corruption among bureaucrats, the independence and effectiveness
of judiciary processes, and finally, the social insurance system in effect. Empirically testing his
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model on a group of countries for the periods 1960-1975 and 1975-1989, Rodrik (1999) finds
that deep social cleavages resulting in income inequality, racial tensions and crimes exacerbate
the effects of large shocks on growth. Conversely, having strong institutions mitigates the growth
differential before and after a shock. What is worth noticing about the results of Rodrik (1999) is
that after controlling for governing factors and social conflicts, the parameters of variables like
trade openness, government spending, and public debt become statistically insignificant. This
finding resonates with what was found in Acemoglu et al. (2003). Documenting the relationship
between economic development and the institutional structures that developing countries
inherited from past European colonists, Acemoglu et al. (2003) show that macroeconomic
volatility and slow growth are more severe in countries with weak institutions, bereft of means to
constrain abuses of power. The researchers went further to argue that institutional weaknesses
constitute the root cause of volatile economic performance while policy distortions and their
associated outcomes only represent the symptoms. So far, the strand of literature on the
institutional impact has two important implications. First, it fills in the “black box” of volatility
accounting that standard economic indicators alone cannot explain. Second, the literature has
been fairly consistent in saying that countries with institutions that promote social equity,
political rights, and law enforcement are better at coping with shocks.
To sum up this section, it is clear that there has not been a conclusive answer to the
question of what makes some countries experience more frequent and serious economic volatility
than others. The impacts of standard economic variables like trade openness, production patterns,
financial development and liberalization are highly inconsistent and oftentimes appear to go in
either direction depending on the specific countries and time periods being sampled. This
represents a challenge for policymakers who attempt to draw from economic evidence but at the
same time an opportunity for researchers who wish to contribute to the existing volatility
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literature with evidence from novel perspectives. Given what has been said, the contributions of
this research are threefold. First, by extending the sampling period to 2019, this study takes into
consideration recent economic progress and global trends that might importantly explain a
country’s susceptibility to growth fluctuations. Second, compared to studies done in the past, I
adopt a more holistic approach to the dissection of growth volatility by providing a discussion
not only on traditional economic variables, such as finance and trade, but also on human
development, political institutions, and especially, fluctuations in productivity - a factor that has
rarely been examined outside the context of its one-to-one correlation with business cycle
fluctuations. Finally, instead of comparing low- and middle-income countries against more
developed nations, this study targets the differences among countries in the two lower income
categories which have received little attention from previous research.
In the next section, I am going to provide a description of the countries included in the
dataset and a discussion on the methodology employed.
IV. Data and Methodology
4.1 Sample Selection
The sample constructed for this study comprises 86 developing countries that were
classified as either low- or middle-income by the World Bank in 1997. For the purpose of
explaining growth volatility using a combination of structural and institutional variables, I do not
consider oil-dependent economies 2 that would otherwise meet the income criterion. This is
because a large part of their economic fluctuations is caused by movements in oil prices rather
than by the aforementioned factors.

2

Here I define oil-reliant economies as those having the average share of oil rents in GDP between 1997 and 2017
exceeding 20 percent.
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Table 1A in the Appendix reports the list of countries used in this study together with
their income status and geographic locations. Overall, it can be inferred from the data that
economic achievements were not evenly distributed across regions and income groups. Out of
the 43 countries classified as low-income in 1997, nearly half of them, with the majority being in
Sub-Saharan Africa, were still in the very same income category more than two decades later.
Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of countries starting as lower-middle income in 1997 have
successfully acquired upper-middle income status as of 2019. For the group of 16 countries
initially classified as upper-middle income, however, only 9 became high-income as of 2019
while the rest never progressed further from the initial income rank. Noteworthily, the majority
of countries that were able to graduate to the high-income category are located in Eastern
Europe, such as Poland, Estonia, and Czech Republic whose economies became intertwined with
the more developed Western Europe after their accession to the European Union in the early
2000s.
Since the 86 countries in the dataset vary greatly with respect to their income levels, they
differ markedly from each other in the institutional strength and financial resources available to
combat economic volatility. Therefore, in order to eliminate any cross-country difference that
might skew the analysis, I divided the sample into two sub-groups. One group includes countries
with per capita GDP in 1997 of at least 8000 in the international dollar (PPP$), called the higherincome developing countries (HIDCs). Countries failing to meet this criterion constitute the
other group called lower-income developing countries (LIDCs). The average income of the
HIDCs was 13,909 PPP$ at the start of the sampling period. Meanwhile, 59 countries in the
LIDC group had per capita GDP averaging at only 3,077 PPP$ in the same year.
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4.2 Measuring growth volatility
Consistent with previous work on the topic of economic volatility, I measure growth
volatility by computing rolling standard deviations of per capita GDP growth rates over
overlapping three-year periods. To be specific, the observation given by the standard deviation of
per capita GDP growth rates between years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 2 is followed by the observation obtained
by applying the same computational technique to the years between 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑡 + 3. Since my
dataset already contains a large number of missing values, if the time periods were completely
non-overlapping as in the approaches chosen by Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) and Haddad et
al. (2012), the sample size would shrink significantly, which might lead to sampling biases. As
for terminology, in this study, I am going to use the terms “growth volatility”, “economic
volatility” and “volatility” interchangeably.
4.3 Some stylized facts about growth volatility
Figure 1 illustrates the average levels of per capita GDP growth volatility in each region
between 1997 and 2019. As expected, the largest spikes in growth volatility coincide with major
economic shocks whose impacts were felt globally, such as the Asian Financial Crisis taking
place during 1997-1999 and the Great Recession between 2007 and 2009. Figure 2 exhibits each
region’s per capita GDP growth rates over time and thus can explain the movements of economic
volatility. For countries in East Asia and the Pacific, the most fluctuating economic performance
was experienced in the late 1990s, induced by the Asian Financial Crisis. The repercussions of
this crisis caused the regional growth rate to dive deeply to a negative 2.5 percent in 1998 before
bouncing back to nearly 4 percent in 1999. Aside from this period, growth was robust in this
region with a high average of 4.46 percent and growth volatility remained the lowest among all
regions for the most part of the 23-year period.
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The picture, however, is very different for other regions. Europe and Central Asia
together achieved sustained high growth from 2000 until the onset of the Great Recession. This
region and Latin America were hit the hardest by the 2007 global crisis, which is evident in the
sudden falls of their growth rates during this time (Figure 2). However, between 2007 and 2011,
growth volatility in Europe and Central Asia is notably higher than that in other regions, even
Latin America. This can be explained by the fact that Europe and Central Asia were growing
very fast before the crisis and later recovered to a high speed while Latin America was growing
at a slower pace both before and after the crisis.
Among all the regions, Middle East and North Africa seem to display the most peculiar
growth path. This region was not much affected by either the Asian Financial Crisis or the Great
Recession. However, while other economies started to regain speed after 2009, Middle Eastern
and North African countries have since plummeted in growth and spiked in growth volatility.
This period of economic instability has been linked to political and social uprisings associated
with the Arab Spring that shook Egypt and Tunisia (Arayssi, Fakih, and Haimoun, 2019).
Meanwhile, Iraq was a war zone during 2014-2017 and Jordan for the past few years has
struggled with the refugee influx from Syria3.

3

See https://www.dni.gov/index.php/the-next-five-years/middle-east-and-north-africa for details.
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Figure 1. Regional average growth volatility during 1997-2019
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Figure 2. Regional average growth rates during 1997-2019
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Data source: World Development Indicators

Across the income spectrum, so far it is not always obvious that low-income economies
are more prone to volatility than the more developed as suggested by the literature. Figure 3
presents the average standard deviations of per capita GDP growth for both the LIDCs and
HIDCs during 1997-2019. It can be inferred from the graph that growth volatility in the higherincome group is only slightly higher than that in the lower-income group during normal times.
However, when global shocks hit, such as in 1997 and 2008, the more advanced economies tend
to be adversely affected to a greater extent than the less developed.
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4.4 Empirical model specification
There are four empirical models that I am going to investigate in this study. They are
specified as follows.
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4)
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Model (1) is the baseline regression model where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of explanatory variables and
𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes an error term. To systematically summarize the final outcome of this study, I divide
the independent variables in (1) into four main categories: economic structure, population, trade,
finance, and productivity. Model (2) adds to model (1) the effect of growth volatility in the
preceding period. Models (3) and (4) are the most comprehensive in the sense that they take into
account the impact of political institutions. Model (4) differs from (3) in the inclusion of a set of
year dummies (𝜏). All models are run with unbalanced panel data. Before running the regression
models, I standardized all the variables using the scale function in R except for the ones already
expressed in rolling standard deviations. The goal of this step is to obtain comparable regressors.
With regard to the regression method, since one of the explanatory variables is a lagged
term of the dependent variable, it would have been ideal to apply the Generalized Method of
Moments procedure to generate the estimators. However, due to time constraints, I made use of
more familiar regression methods for panel data, which are the fixed-effects and random-effects.
To determine between the two types of regressions, I performed Hausman tests, which indicated
that for most empirical models examined in this study, the random-effects method offered more
consistent estimators. The final results reported in the next section, therefore, are those derived
from random-effects regressions. Additionally, the standard errors have been adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In what follows, I am going to provide a brief description of each variable included in
this study. Further details of variable descriptions and transformations can be found in Table 2A.
4.4.1 Economic structure
Although it has been shown in Section 4.3 that higher-income countries, on average, do
not always exhibit less volatility, it does not entail that there is no statistical correlation
whatsoever between initial per capita GDP levels and growth volatility in the following three
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years. Figure A1 plots growth volatility against per capita output for all countries in the dataset.
It can be inferred from the plot that as income rises, growth volatility initially declines, then
increases slightly before eventually dwindling towards the upper end of the middle-income
range. To capture this relationship in the best way possible, I am going to examine the impact of
the initial income level in both level and quadratic terms.
In addition to a country’s level of economic development, I am also interested in
exploring the relationship between growth volatility and the relative size of government
expenditure and the agricultural sector. Here the size of the government sector is given by the
share of government expenditure in a country’s GDP, while that of the agricultural sector is
measured by the percentage contribution of agricultural output to GDP. The potential effect of
government spending on growth volatility, as discussed in Section 3.3, cannot be easily
determined with economic theory or existing evidence from previous studies.
With regard to the effect of the agricultural sector, it can be reasonably expected that
countries having large portions of their output coming from agriculture experience more growth
fluctuations than others. This is because prices of agricultural commodities are highly unstable,
and production can be easily disrupted by bad weather conditions. On average, the economies of
the LIDCs are much more reliant on agriculture for output (21.6% of GDP) compared to the
HIDCs (5.2% of GDP).
4.4.2 Population
There are two aspects of a country’s population that I investigate in this study: the size of
the population and the level of human capital accumulation.
The size of a country’s population reveals information about the size of the domestic
market. It has been widely recognized by literature on economic volatility that larger markets
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offer better risk diversification and, therefore, more stability. As a result, a larger population base
can be predicted to mitigate per capita GDP fluctuations.
Human development matters because the skill level of a labor force reflects the level of
technology involved in the production it undertakes. Generally speaking, goods that are more
sophisticated are often less volatile in prices and thus promise a more even growth path. Here I
proxy human capital by the average years of schooling completed by adults aged 25 and above.
Data for this variable was extracted from the United Nations Development Programs.
4.4.3 Trade
The first aspect of trade inspected in this study is the combined share of import and
export values in a country’s GDP, which I use to substitute for the level of trade openness. The
summary statistics reveal that the developing countries considered in this study are highly open
to global markets, with some emerging markets like Malaysia and Vietnam having trade shares
exceeding 200 percent of GDP in several years. On average, higher-income countries are more
open to trade compared to the less developed with the trade-to-GDP ratios registered at 88.5 and
71.8 percent, respectively. Notably, these numbers are substantially large when compared to the
average of roughly 26 percent4 reported for the U.S during 1997-2017. The expected correlation
between trade liberalization and growth volatility, however, is indeterminate due to contradictory
empirical evidence.
The second trade-related indicator I examine is volatility in commodity terms of trade
(ToT). Extracted from the International Monetary Fund, commodity ToT denotes the difference
between export and import prices as a percentage of GDP for a set of commodities that
encompass the following categories: energy (including coal, crude oil, and gas), metals, food and

4

Based on author’s calculations with data obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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beverages, and finally, agricultural raw materials (such as cotton, logs, rubbers, sunflower seed
oil, etc.).
The last trade element included in this study is the export concentration index, a
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index that reveals how diversified a country’s export basket
is. The index is measured for commodities at the three-digit level of SITC and obtained from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD). The index runs from 0 to 1
with a higher value indicating more concentration. As discussed in the previous section,
economies whose export baskets are not diversified tend to be more susceptible to external
shocks. Interestingly, a simple plot of the correlation between diversification and volatility as
shown in Figure A2 suggests that higher concentration does not necessarily exacerbate economic
fluctuations until after the index surpasses 0.6. In general, countries in the dataset seem to favor
diversified as opposed to concentrated trade patterns with the index averaging at only 0.3 for
LDICs and 0.2 for HIDCs.
4.4.4 Finance
For financial variables, I follow the standard route to define the stage of financial
development using the size of domestic credit provided to the private sector as a percentage of
GDP. Between the two groups, there is big gap with regard to the relative size of credit supplied.
Specifically, the average credit-to-GDP ratio in the HIDCs is 57.5 percent while that for the
LDICs is only 27.8 percent.
As previously discussed, the relationship between a more developed financial system and
economic volatility has been presented with contradictory evidence. The relationship, however,
is fairly straightforward in Figure A3. The plot suggests that a higher level of financial
development lessens rather than magnifies economic fluctuations along the growth path.
However, as the size of credit supply increases, the impact of financial development flattens out,
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which contradicts the argument put forth by the “too much finance” hypothesis in which there
should be upward pressure on volatility when credit supply gets too large.
With regard to financial openness, I employ the ratio of FDI net inflows to GDP as the
sole indicator due to the lack of data on bank borrowing and portfolio investment. Noteworthily,
for a few low-income countries in the dataset, FDI net inflows for some years were reported with
negative values, signifying more disinvestment being made by foreign investors than investment.
Overall, the contribution of capital inflows from abroad is very small compared to the sizes of
the economies, averaging at only 4.1 percent for the LIDCs and 3.9 percent for the HIDCs. There
is, however, not enough consistent evidence to form a conjecture about the effect of financial
liberalization on economic volatility.
Finally, I am going to look into the impact on growth variance of price changes in the
domestic market. The level of price fluctuations is measured by the rolling standard deviations of
inflation rates over three consecutive years. In the absence of price stability, investors would find
it hard to correctly estimate returns on investment, causing investment disruptions which are
linked to economic volatility by the Keynesian theory.
4.4.5 Productivity
To investigate the relationship between productivity and growth fluctuations, for every
three-year period in the dataset, I compute a rolling standard deviation of productivity growth
rates, which in turn are given by the year-to-year percentage change of value added per worker.
The three sectors of which volatility in productivity I am going examine are agriculture, industry
and services.
As summarized in Table A3, production efficiency grows the fastest in agriculture and
this holds true for both higher-income and lower-income groups. Contrary to the widely held
perception that higher-income countries often pay more attention to modern sectors as opposed
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to the agricultural sector, the HIDCs in the dataset outperform the other lower-income group in
terms of agricultural productivity growth while the latter group have more success in improving
labor efficiency in industrial and service production. With regard to volatility, agriculture
witnessed the most fluctuations out of the three sectors and the service sector experienced the
least.
Figures A4, A5, and A6 in the Appendix provide a preliminary description of the link
between the productivity indicators and per capita GDP growth volatility. It can be inferred from
the plots that fluctuations in productivity growth in all three sectors are positively correlated with
growth volatility in the rest of the economy. However, since the correlations are not strictly
linear, the degree to which productivity fluctuations affect growth volatility must be evaluated by
more sophisticated statistical analysis.
4.4.6 Political Institutions
For the purpose of this research, I obtained variables containing information about the
characteristics of political arrangements from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). To
assess the quality of a country’s governing body, the WGI compiles data provided by a wide
range of household and firm surveys, business intelligence agencies, non-governmental and
governmental organizations. Preliminary data are evaluated, rescaled, then reconstructed using a
statistical technique called Unobserved Components Model (UCM). The final indices stretch
from negative 2.5 to 2.5, with higher values denoting better governing quality.
There are six indices reported by the WGI, each concerned with a unique governing
aspect. However, since the indices are highly correlated, I only check the significance of the two
most relevant aspects suggested by the literature on political institutions. One of them is called
Voice and Accountability, capturing the perceptions of the extent to which citizens of a country
can participate in selecting their government, the degree of transparency practiced by the state
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when it comes to economic policy and financial statistics, and the degrees to which freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and a free media are protected. The aspects covered by the
Voice and Accountability index, denoted as VA, are similar to those constituting the Civil
Liberties Index, an institutional indicator employed by Coríc and Pugh (2013) and Haddad et al.
(2012) in their research on the determinants of economic disturbances. The second index is Rule
of Law (or RL), revealing the degree of confidence that agents can have in the abidance of laws,
contract enforcement, and the protection of property rights, in addition to their perceptions about
the likelihood of crime and violence. Figures A7 and A8 suggest that better governing quality, as
reflected through higher VA and RL index scores, helps reduce growth volatility though the
impact appears to be minute.
V. Results
The main regression outcomes of this study are summarized in Table 1 for the lowerincome countries and Table 2 for the higher-income group. In each table, columns (1), (2), (3),
and (4) summarize the regression outcomes of the corresponding models specified in Section IV.
The regression models generating the results captured under columns (5) and (6) are exactly the
same to those in (3) and (4) except for the Voice and Accountability index being replaced by the
Rule of Law index. In what follows, I am going to discuss the regression outcomes in depth.
5.1 Lower-income developing countries
For the group of lower-income countries, at the first glance, the most important
determinant of variations in per capita GDP growth is the magnitude of growth volatility in the
preceding period. Between models (1) and (2), the value of adjusted R-squared, a measure of the
goodness-of-fit of the regression models, jumps from 20 to more than 40 percent just by adding
the lagged dependent variable. Structural variables, including the initial per capita GDP level and
the size of the government sector, are also found to play critical roles.
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Table 1. Random-effects regression results for lower-income developing countries
Dependent variable: per capita GDP growth volatility
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
0.450***
0.423***
0.428***
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.07)
GDP/capita
1.004***
0.514**
0.591**
0.690***
(0.28)
(0.22)
(0.26)
(0.24)
(GDP/capita) squared
-0.448*
-0.289
-0.422
-0.223
(0.27)
(0.24)
(0.26)
(0.25)
Government spending
0.181***
0.111**
0.142***
0.159***
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.05)
Agriculture’s share
0.410***
0.168
0.171
0.154
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Population
0.099**
0.039
0.047
0.023
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Education
-0.181**
-0.118*
-0.114
-0.075
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Trade openness
0.017
-0.073
-0.071
-0.083
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
ToT volatility
0.02
-0.008
-0.014
-0.0002
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
Ex. Concentration Index
0.08
0.069
0.055
0.085
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Private credit share
-0.493***
-0.227***
-0.273***
-0.229***
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.07)
FDI share
0.012
0.045
0.045
0.056
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Inflation volatility
0.075***
0.041**
0.045*
0.014
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Productivity volatility (AGR)
0.056***
0.037**
0.044**
0.040**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Productivity volatility (IND)
0.059**
0.021
0.016
0.015
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Productivity volatility (SERV)
-0.01
0.002
0.012
0.005
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Voice and Accountability
-0.114*
-0.111*
(0.07)
(0.06)
Rule of Law
Independent variables
Lagged dependent variable

1.450***
0.762***
0.827***
1.500***
(0.23)
(0.17)
(0.20)
(0.36)
Observations
857
857
726
726
Adjusted R2
0.193
0.404
0.391
0.411
F-Statistic
220.086*** 595.252*** 482.327*** 542.572***
Hausman Test (p-value)
0.071
0.339
0.377
0.19
Note: Hausman tests suggest that fixed-effects method is preferrable for Model (6)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Constant

Model (5)
0.428***
(0.07)
0.580**
(0.25)
-0.375
(0.26)
0.147***
(0.05)
0.16
(0.11)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.119
(0.08)
-0.077
(0.09)
-0.012
(0.04)
0.063
(0.09)
-0.266***
(0.08)
0.043
(0.06)
0.041*
(0.02)
0.044**
(0.02)
0.016
(0.03)
0.011
(0.03)

Model (6)
0.433***
(0.07)
0.685***
(0.23)
-0.158
(0.24)
0.168***
(0.05)
0.145
(0.11)
0.024
(0.04)
-0.077
(0.08)
-0.092
(0.09)
0.003
(0.05)
0.094
(0.08)
-0.220***
(0.07)
0.053
(0.06)
0.008
(0.02)
0.040**
(0.02)
0.015
(0.03)
0.004
(0.03)

-0.219***
(0.07)
0.745***
(0.19)
726
0.398
497.087***
0.2166

-0.227***
(0.06)
1.387***
(0.36)
726
0.423
569.585***
0.00232

Despite the perplexing correlation between initial income levels and economic
fluctuations described in Figure 5, the regression results suggest a more direct relationship in
which a one standard-deviation increase in per capita GDP is expected to raise volatility in the
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following three-year period by 0.685 to 0.69 percentage points depending on the institutional
variable being considered. The effect is significant at the 1 percent level when time effects are
taken into account and the 5 percent level without time effects.
With regard to the impact of the government sector, the coefficient is found to be
significant at the 1 percent level across all the models investigated. The magnitude of the impact,
however, is smaller when compared to that of income. To be specific, with the inclusion of time
dummies, a one standard-deviation rise in the share of public spending in GDP only induces
volatility to go up by 0.22 percentage points. This finding supports the theory of a crowding-out
effect, which holds that an extensive government sector would prevent resources from being
effectively allocated to the private sector, and thus contributes to the destabilization of an
economy (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2006).
The last structural indicator, the share of agricultural output in GDP, posts a positive and
significant correlation with per capita GDP growth volatility in the simplest version of the
empirical models. However, the estimator quickly becomes insignificant when the variable is
analyzed alongside institutional factors.
Between the two variables denoting the size and the average level of education of a
population, none plays a significant role in regulating volatility. However, this regression
outcome does not imply that there is no desirable return whatsoever to investment in education.
It is worth remembering that this study only observes changes to growth rates within the three
years after an improvement in the average level of educational attainment has been recorded.
Meanwhile, human capital can have a more enduring impact on growth variations through the
enhancement of productivity, a component of long-term growth.
None of the trade-related factors is found to have a significant influence on growth
volatility although it might be important to note that, for the variable denoting the share of trade
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in GDP, the signs of the coefficients are negative in all regression models except for the last one.
This is indicative of the risk-sharing benefit of international trade. However, given there is a
significant amount of ambiguity and conflicting evidence surrounding the theory of trade
liberalization, it is not surprising to see the magnitude of trade’s influence on volatility clustering
around small numbers and carrying no statistical significance. Also related to trade, the positive,
though not significant, coefficients associated with the export concentration index seem to
confirm the widely held belief that economic instability is greater when a country risks putting
all of its “eggs” in a few baskets.
To understand how the magnitude of growth volatility changes with terms-of-trade
shocks when an export basket is less diversified, I re-ran models (5) and (6) for only the lowerincome group with an interaction term between terms-of-trade fluctuations and the concentration
index. Detailed results are reported in the Appendix (Table A5) with a significant parameter of
the interaction term at the 5 percent level. To be specific, if terms-of-trade volatility goes up by
one percentage point and the concentration index is increased by one standard deviation, growth
volatility is expected to be 0.062 standard-deviation higher than if that were not the case. This
finding implies that while the descriptive analysis would suggest an export basket must be highly
concentrated for its impact on growth volatility to be observed clearly, the potential negative
impact of a specialized trade pattern cannot be neglected if the country mostly exports raw
materials and agricultural goods that are susceptible to large degrees of price fluctuations.
In terms of financial development, a larger pool of credit provided to domestic businesses
is found to reduce economic disturbances at the 1 percent significance level. This finding echoes
the conclusions established in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006), Haddad et al. (2012) and
Denizer, Ayigun, and Owen (2000). Moreover, it is consistent with the “too much finance”
theory, in which it is claimed that strong credit expansions generally benefit economies at the
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early stage of financial development, which happens to be the case for the majority of countries
in the lower-income group. Regarding the magnitude of the impact, when the relative size of
credit supply is expanded by one standard deviation, growth variations would shrink by around
0.22 percentage points after controlling for time dummies. Related to financial and monetary
policies, inflation is suggested by models (3) and (5) to represent a challenge for lower-income
countries in terms of economic stability. The significance of the correlation between volatility
and price changes, however, dies out when time effects are considered.
With regard to productivity fluctuations, only those in agriculture contribute significantly
to the overall growth variability. This is not surprising because agriculture, on average, accounts
for more than one-fifth of the total output in the lower-income countries. The impact, however,
falls behind other explanatory factors in terms of its magnitude. It is estimated that a one
percentage-point increase in the volatility of agricultural productivity only raises per capita GDP
growth variations by 0.04 percentage points.
The remaining regressors concern the indices representing the quality of a governing
body. Between the two indices chosen for this study, better Rule of Law significantly reduces
volatility at the 1 percent level while Voice and Accountability only has a marginally significant
impact. Regardless, the two indicators bear alike correlations with growth volatility and the
correlations are as expected: a more transparent government, a stronger law enforcement system,
and a less violent society are all shown to result in a more stable economy. This result is
supported by a large body of literature. Sahay et al. (2015) point out that better governing
quality, as measured by the same Rule of Law index obtained from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators, is conducive to the development of the financial sector, which has been shown by this
study to have a significant stabilizing effect on growth volatility. Meanwhile, in Aghion,
Banerjee and Piketty (1999), when explaining why developing nations tend to experience more
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economic volatility than more developed ones, the researchers lay an emphasis on the role of the
regulatory system in addition to the problem of asymmetric information, arguing that it is not
only the poorly functioning financial sector but also the loose protection of property rights, poor
infrastructure, and high inequality that widen the separation between savers and borrowers,
leading to disruptions in credit supply as discussed in Section 3.2.
To sum up, the reduction of growth volatility in lower-income countries would require a
combination of a smaller government role, better access to liquidity provided by financial
intermediaries, and last but not least, strong political institutions that effectively regulate
economic activity.
5.2 Higher-income developing countries
Unlike for the lower-income group, the regression results for higher-income countries do
not observe significant influence from government spending, access to finance, or any of the
institutional indicators. The signs of the coefficients associated with the four aforementioned
variables, however, stay the same regardless of what income group is being considered,
suggesting that the directions of their impacts do not change as a country moves up the income
rank.
In order to conclude with more confidence the nonexistence of a turnaround effect, I
reconstructed regression models (5) and (6) with the inclusion of a quadratic term of the variable
capturing the size of credit supply. The regression, of which results can be seen in the Appendix
(Table A6), detects no significant impact of financial development on the fluctuations of per
capita GDP growth, whether in level or quadratic terms. This confirms the observation I made
with the descriptive analysis that large expansions of credit supply have not constituted a
challenge for the developing countries considered in this study, at least in terms of growth
volatility. It is worth mentioning that credit provision exceeding 100 percent of GDP, the point at
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which Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) predict that the turnaround effect would emerge,
happened very rarely in higher-income countries during the period 1997-2019 with the exception
of Thailand, Chile, Malaysia and South Africa. What is confounding about the latter three
economies is that, on average, their per capita GDP growth volatility stayed very close to the
mean value reported for the higher-income countries even during periods of strong credit booms.
Meanwhile, in terms of institutional quality, only Chile scored relatively high on the scale of the
WGI, especially with respect to Rule and Laws and Regulatory Quality, while the scores of the
others were not noticeably better than the average. This suggests that the quality of supervision
cannot be the reason why Malaysia and South Africa managed to maintain slow but relatively
stable growth with their very large financial sectors. Therefore, I believe it will help further our
knowledge of the correlation between financial development and economic volatility if future
studies examine each country-specific case in depth.
Moving on to other explanatory variables, volatility in the preceding period continues to
have its significant and strong impact prolonged to the next period. The quadratic form of initial
per capita GDP level is reported to be significant at the 10 percent level in the models with time
effects included. This suggests that, while the evidence is not strong, there is a non-linear
relationship between the stage of economic development and the level of volatility to which a
higher-income country is subject. To be specific, volatility initially becomes larger as the country
makes more economic progress but eventually declines after income has surpassed a certain
point.
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Table 2. Random-effects regression results for higher-income developing countries
Dependent variable: per capita GDP growth volatility
Model (5)
0.567***
(0.06)
0.423
(0.28)
-0.065
(0.06)
0.128
(0.12)
0.919**
(0.44)
0.363
(0.35)
-0.241
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.07)
0.114*
(0.06)
-0.077
(0.10)
-0.092
(0.07)
0.126
(0.11)
0.070*
(0.04)
0.012
(0.01)
0.144*
(0.08)
0.041***
(0.01)

Model (6)
0.550***
(0.06)
0.487**
(0.22)
-0.082*
(0.05)
0.053
(0.10)
0.813**
(0.34)
0.351
(0.32)
-0.088
(0.18)
-0.067
(0.06)
0.056
(0.05)
-0.005
(0.08)
-0.048
(0.05)
0.096
(0.12)
0.023
(0.03)
0.013
(0.01)
0.119**
(0.06)
0.036***
(0.01)

0.011
(0.12)
Constant
1.976***
0.709**
0.808**
1.272***
0.817**
(0.38)
(0.35)
(0.37)
(0.38)
(0.36)
Observations
429
429
357
357
357
Adjusted R2
0.252
0.469
0.556
0.641
0.556
F-Statistic
159.290*** 394.713*** 463.283*** 673.575*** 463.037***
Hausman Test (p-value)
0.017
0.009
0.067
0.507
0.159
Notes: Hausman tests suggest that fixed-effects method is preferrable for Models (1) and (2)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

-0.018
(0.08)
1.266***
(0.38)
357
0.64
670.697***
0.639

Independent variables

Model (1)

Lagged dependent variable
GDP/capita
(GDP/capita) squared
Government spending
Agriculture’s share
Population
Education
Trade openness
ToT volatility
Ex. Concentration Index
Private credit share
FDI share
Inflation volatility
Productivity volatility (AGR)
Productivity volatility (IND)
Productivity volatility (SERV)

0.847**
(-0.348)
-0.131*
(-0.07)
0.249*
(-0.137)
1.504***
(0.49)
0.668
(0.44)
-0.438*
(0.23)
0.065
(0.09)
0.023
(0.07)
0.14
(0.12)
-0.067
(0.08)
0.245
(0.18)
0.138***
(0.04)
0.017
(0.01)
0.285***
(0.07)
0.063**
(0.03)

Model (2)
0.486***
(0.06)
0.454*
(0.24)
-0.069
(0.05)
0.1
(0.11)
0.602
(0.38)
0.397
(0.36)
-0.272
(0.18)
0.011
(0.07)
0.075
(0.06)
0.047
(0.09)
-0.06
(0.06)
0.116
(0.15)
0.102**
(0.04)
0.012
(0.01)
0.127*
(0.07)
0.049***
(0.02)

Voice and Accountability
Rule of Law
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Model (3)
0.566***
(0.06)
0.426
(0.28)
-0.065
(0.06)
0.129
(0.12)
0.919**
(0.44)
0.364
(0.35)
-0.246
(0.19)
-0.018
(0.07)
0.112*
(0.06)
-0.077
(0.10)
-0.092
(0.07)
0.127
(0.11)
0.070*
(0.04)
0.012
(0.01)
0.145*
(0.08)
0.041***
(0.01)
-0.025
(0.08)

Model (4)
0.547***
(0.06)
0.496**
(0.22)
-0.083*
(0.05)
0.053
(0.10)
0.824**
(0.34)
0.352
(0.32)
-0.094
(0.19)
-0.064
(0.06)
0.048
(0.05)
-0.002
(0.08)
-0.048
(0.05)
0.098
(0.12)
0.023
(0.03)
0.013
(0.01)
0.121**
(0.06)
0.036***
(0.01)
-0.065
(0.06)

In terms of the magnitude of the impact, the share of agricultural output in GDP is the
most important determinant of growth volatility for the group of HIDCs. A one standarddeviation increase in the relative size of the agricultural sector is estimated to raise per capita
GDP fluctuations in the following three years by 0.8 percentage points with the consideration of
time dummies. What is worrying about this finding is that since the 1980s, there has been a trend
where Latin American economies, which make up one-third of higher-income countries in the
dataset, revert to specializing in agricultural and resource-heavy sectors after failed attempts to
build up industries that would be productive enough to compete in international markets (Paus,
2017). Given the positive correlation between volatility and the size of the agricultural sector and
the negative link between volatility and economic growth, it can be expected that if this trend is
continued into the future, not only will these economies be unlikely to escape from the state of
economic stagnation in which most of them currently find themselves, but their living standards
could even retrogress.
The last group of variables found to have a significant impact on growth volatility entails
productivity fluctuations in the industrial and service sectors. While the coefficients associated
with service productivity growth have more statistical significance, their magnitude lags behind
those of industrial productivity. With time effects taken into account, a one standard-deviation
increase in fluctuations of industrial productivity growth causes per capita GDP growth volatility
to go up by 0.12 percentage points. Meanwhile, the effect resulted from the same rise in service
productivity fluctuations is only 0.036 percentage points, which is about the size of the estimated
coefficients reported for volatility in agricultural productivity in the analysis of lower-income
countries.
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In summary, for higher-income countries, the key to economic stability lies in a smaller
agricultural sector and the ability of governing institutions and business owners to maintain
persistent productivity growth.
VI. Policy implications and limitations
The empirical findings for both groups of income are suggestive of an inevitable trade-off
between economic development and volatility, meaning a higher level of income may not be
achieved without greater uncertainty and abrupt changes. As a result, alongside policies that are
focused on supporting growth, governments of developing countries must also prepare to deal
with a greater degree of economic shocks, especially the consequences they might have on
people who are already economically vulnerable. A common approach to preserving welfare is to
increase public funding in areas such as unemployment insurance, public transportation,
healthcare, and education, etc. However, the results of this study suggest that governments of
lower-income countries should be cautious about this approach as too much public spending can
exacerbate volatility. A better solution would be to maintain the supply of liquidity so that
domestic firms can stay in operation during times of high uncertainty and thus maintain
employment and salary payment for their workers. For more developed economies in the middleincome range, strengthening the welfare system might help, but enhancing productivity and
boosting production in high-skilled sectors were empirically found to be more effective solutions
in terms of economic stabilization.
As with many studies, this study is not the one without its limitations. Indeed, there are
two limitations that can narrow the applicability of its findings. First, the study only considers
growth volatility over three-year spans. This means that it cannot fully account for the influence
of long-term variables, such as investments in human capital and physical capital that determine
economic performance in the long run. Indeed, findings obtained by Mallick (2013) suggest that
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the same external shocks can impact an economy on different levels depending on whether the
impact is evaluated in the short term or long term. Therefore, a meaningful extension of this
paper would be to examine volatility over a longer time span to see how the magnitude and
significance levels of the estimators will change from the ones previously discussed.
Second, this study was conducted with relatively narrow definitions of economic
indicators. For instance, economic volatility is restricted to per capita GDP growth fluctuations.
Meanwhile, there could be interesting insights from examining consumption and investment
volatility separately from GDP. Similarly, in terms of human capital, Mincer (1984) argues that
assessing the “transmission and embodiment” of people with “available knowledge” alone does
not provide the complete picture. According to the author, a comprehensive approach must also
take into account the creation of new knowledge and of technological advances that foster
growth, the factors that were not investigated in this study due to data limitations.
The two aforementioned limitations, together with the puzzling relationship between
financial development and growth volatility in some countries, constitute the avenues along
which this research can be extended.
VI. Concluding remarks
Studying a group of 86 developing economies for the period between 1997 and 2019, I
found that the determinants of growth volatility vary depending on where a country is along the
process of development. For countries starting at low-income levels, to mitigate volatility, it is
essential to control excessive government spending, improve access to credit, and reduce
fluctuations in agricultural productivity. On top of that, better property rights protection and
contract enforcement are also found to generate downward pressure on volatility. For countries
of higher-income ranks, the key to stable growth lies in an economic structure that is less
dependent on agricultural production as well as mechanisms to modulate productivity
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fluctuations in the industrial and service sectors. It is also important to note that, for both income
groups investigated in this study, there is a significant and robust correlation between volatility
in the current and the preceding periods, meaning any effort to control volatility today is likely to
benefit the economy for many more years into the future. However, it also means that for any
failure to contain volatility, we cannot expect its consequences to be quickly dissolved.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. List of countries along with their income status and geographical areas
Country name
Tajikistan
Haiti
Afghanistan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Chad
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Togo
Uganda
Cambodia
Mongolia
Vietnam
Kyrgyz Republic
Honduras
Nicaragua
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Benin
Cameroon
Comoros
Côte d'Ivoire

Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Mauritania
Nigeria
Senegal
Tanzania
Zambia
Panama *

1997 Income Status
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
LM

2019 Income Status
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
LM
H
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Regional Area
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America & Caribbean

Table A1. List of countries along with their income status and geographical areas (continued)
Philippines
LM
LM
East Asia & Pacific
Bolivia
LM
LM
Latin America & Caribbean
El Salvador
LM
LM
Latin America & Caribbean
Egypt, Arab Rep.
LM
LM
Middle East & North Africa
Morocco
LM
LM
Middle East & North Africa
Tunisia
LM
LM
Middle East & North Africa
Sri Lanka
LM
LM
South Asia
China
LM
UM
East Asia & Pacific
Indonesia
LM
UM
East Asia & Pacific
Thailand *
LM
UM
East Asia & Pacific
Belarus
LM
UM
Europe & Central Asia
Georgia
LM
UM
Europe & Central Asia
Kazakhstan *
LM
UM
Europe & Central Asia
Colombia *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Costa Rica *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Dominican Republic *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Guatemala
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Guyana
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Jamaica *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Paraguay *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Peru
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Suriname *
LM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Iraq
LM
UM
Middle East & North Africa
Jordan *
LM
UM
Middle East & North Africa
Namibia
LM
UM
Sub-Saharan Africa
Croatia *
UM
H
Europe & Central Asia
Czech Republic *
UM
H
Europe & Central Asia
Estonia *
UM
H
Europe & Central Asia
Poland *
UM
H
Europe & Central Asia
Slovak Republic *
UM
H
Europe & Central Asia
Chile *
UM
H
Latin America & Caribbean
Uruguay *
UM
H
Latin America & Caribbean
Bahrain *
UM
H
Middle East & North Africa
Mauritius *
UM
H
Sub-Saharan Africa
Malaysia *
UM
UM
East Asia & Pacific
Turkey *
UM
UM
Europe & Central Asia
Brazil *
UM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Mexico *
UM
UM
Latin America & Caribbean
Lebanon *
UM
UM
Middle East & North Africa
Botswana *
UM
UM
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa *
UM
UM
Sub-Saharan Africa
Note: Countries marked with (*) are the classified by the author of this study as Higher-income Developing
Countries (HIDCs). The rest are Lower-income Developing Countries (LIDCs).
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Table A2. Variable description

Explanatory variables
Initial GDP/capita
GDP/capita growth
Government expenditure
(% GDP)
Agriculture, value added
(% GDP)

Description
Per capita values for gross domestic product (GDP) that
is expressed in current international dollars and
converted by purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion
factor.
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based
on constant local currency.
All government current expenditures for purchases of
goods and services, including compensation of
employees and most expenditures on national defense.
The net output of the agriculture sector, including
forestry, hunting and fishing, and cultivation of crops
and livestock production.

Source
World Development
Indicators
World Development
Indicators
World Development
Indicators
World Development
Indicators

Population, total

The number of all residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

World Development
Indicators

Mean years of schooling

The average number of years of education received by
people ages 25 and older, converted from educational
attainment levels using official durations of each level.

UN Development
Program

Trade openness

The sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of gross domestic product.

World Development
Indicators

Commodity Terms-oftrade Volatility

Export concentration index

Rolling standard deviations of net export price index,
which is measured by weighted by ratio of net exports to
GDP for individual commodities.
A normalized Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of the
product concentration of merchandise exports at the
country level. This index ranges from zero to one. A
higher value denotes higher concentration.

International Monetary
Fund

UNCTAD

Private credit share
(% GDP)

Financial resources provided to the private sector by
financial corporations. For some countries these claims
include credit to public enterprises. The financial
corporations include monetary authorities and deposit
money banks, as well as other financial corporations
where data are available.

World Development
Indicators

FDI share
(% GDP)

The net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest (10 percent or more of voting
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other
than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital,
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and
short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.

World Development
Indicators

Inflation volatility

Rolling standard deviation of inflation rates calculated
by the consumer price index.

World Development
Indicators

Productivity growth
volatility (AGR)

Rolling standard deviation of annual growth rates of
value added per worker. Agriculture includes forestry,
hunting, and fishing as well as cultivation of crops and
livestock production.
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World Development
Indicators

Table A2. Variable description (continued)

Productivity growth
volatility (IND)

Rolling standard deviation of annual growth rates of
value added per worker. Industry comprises value added
in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate
subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas.

World Development
Indicators

Productivity growth
volatility (SERV)

Rolling standard deviation of annual growth rates of
value added per worker. Services include value added in
wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and
restaurants), transport, and government, financial,
professional, and personal services such as education,
health care, and real estate services.

World Development
Indicators

Voice and Accountability

Perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media. The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.

Worldwide Governance
Indicators

Rule of Law

Perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. The index ranges from
-2.5 to 2.5.

Worldwide Governance
Indicators
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Table A3. Summary Statistics
Explanatory variables

Lower-income Developing
Countries
Mean Max
Min
SD

Higher-income Developing
Countries
Mean Max
Min
SD

GDP/capita growth

2.78

17.03

-10.86

3.16

2.39

10.80

-9.67

3.14

GDP/capita volatility
(t to t+2)

1.70

9.20

0.03

1.55

1.90

8.78

0.03

1.62

GDP/capita volatility
(t+1 to t+3)
Population (100,000,000
people)
GDP/capita (1000 PPP$)

1.86

19.06

0.03

1.85

2.01

11.58

0.03

1.72

0.90

13.90

0.01

2.66

0.30

2.08

0.01

0.46

4.46

19.07

0.73

3.39

18.15

48.30

8.14

7.97

Trade (% GDP)

71.82

311.35

20.72

37.22

88.51

220.41

16.44

42.18

Commodity ToT volatility
(t to t+2)
Export concentration index

1.38

12.53

0.01

1.44

1.16

7.88

0.01

1.22

0.35

0.98

0.07

0.19

0.24

0.90

0.06

0.17

FDI (% GDP)

4.06

103.34

-37.15

7.67

3.93

23.21

-8.40

3.29

Private credit (% GDP)

28.94

156.23

2.34

25.10

57.55

160.12

11.67

36.10

Inflation rate

6.32

59.22

-3.10

5.80

4.82

22.03

-3.75

3.61

Inflation volatility
(t to t+2)
Government expenditure (%
GDP)
Agriculture, value added
(% GDP)
Mean years of schooling

2.64

28.15

0.03

2.83

1.72

8.99

0.07

1.48

13.30

41.89

3.46

5.30

15.38

24.90

7.20

3.75

21.61

66.03

3.76

11.50

5.23

14.80

0.26

3.02

5.40

12.80

1.00

2.60

9.00

12.90

5.20

1.70

Agricultural productivity
growth
Industrial productivity growth

2.69

86.19

-38.16

8.02

3.53

65.60

-35.37

10.54

1.92

115.13

-37.77

9.85

1.30

20.59

-25.78

5.25

Service productivity growth

1.47

87.54

-15.95

5.74

1.28

13.24

-9.84

3.25

Agriculture productivity
growth volatility (t to t+2)
Industrial productivity growth
volatility (t to t+2)
Service productivity growth
volatility (t to t+2)
Voice and Accountability

5.30

48.72

0.07

5.47

8.40

50.93

0.13

7.47

3.06

39.67

0.04

4.05

2.16

15.48

0.02

1.84

3.03

50.82

0.04

3.95

2.29

9.32

0.01

1.68

-0.50

0.60

-1.75

0.56

0.33

1.29

-1.32

0.63

Rule of Law

-0.65

0.52

-1.90

0.44

0.16

1.43

-1.25

0.64
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Table A4. Correlation between government indicators
Government
Effectiveness
Government
Effectiveness
Control of
Corruption
Rule of Law
Regulatory
Quality
Voice and
Accountability
Political Stability

Control of
Corruption

Rule of
Law

Regulatory
Quality

Voice and
Accountability

Political
Stability

1

0.834952

0.885488

0.874842

0.574597

0.550797

0.834952

1

0.892508

0.751337

0.603083

0.637065

0.885488

0.892508

1

0.833079

0.641534

0.648509

0.874842

0.751337

0.833079

1

0.637075

0.52036

0.574597

0.603083

0.641534

0.637075

1

0.509088

0.550797

0.637065

0.648509

0.52036

0.509088

1
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Table A5. Random-effects for LIDCs with an interaction term between ToT volatility and the
concentration index
Dependent variable:
per capita GDP growth volatility
Model (5)
Independent variables
***

Lagged dependent variable
GDP/capita
(GDP/capita) squared
Government spending
Agriculture’s share
Population
Education
Trade share
ToT volatility
Ex. Concentration Index
Private credit share
FDI share
Inflation volatility
Productivity volatility (AGR)
Productivity volatility (IND)
Productivity volatility (SERV)
Rule of Law
ToT volatility*Concentration index
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
F Statistic
Note:

0.428
(0.07)
0.496*
(0.26)
-0.407
(0.26)
0.159***
(0.05)
0.176
(0.11)
0.031
(0.04)
-0.1
(0.08)
-0.074
(0.09)
-0.083*
(0.04)
-0.055
(0.11)
-0.259***
(0.08)
0.051
(0.06)
0.045*
(0.02)
0.043**
(0.02)
0.014
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.201***
(0.06)
0.059**
(0.03)
0.807***
(0.19)
726
0.405
511.339***

Model (6)
0.435***
(0.07)
0.589***
(0.23)
-0.213
(0.24)
0.179***
(0.05)
0.167
(0.11)
0.005
(0.04)
-0.055
(0.07)
-0.089
(0.09)
-0.089*
(0.05)
-0.021
(0.11)
-0.211***
(0.07)
0.065
(0.06)
0.012
(0.02)
0.040**
(0.02)
0.012
(0.03)
0.002
(0.03)
-0.208***
(0.06)
0.062**
(0.03)
1.446***
(0.35)
726
0.427
579.007***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table A6. Random-effects for HIDCs with the quadratic form of the credit supply variable
Dependent variable:
per capita GDP growth volatility
Model (5)
Independent variables
***

Lagged dependent variable

0.536
(0.06)
0.444*
(0.24)
-0.06
(0.05)
0.167
(0.10)
0.759**
(0.38)
0.188
(0.37)
-0.329**
(0.16)
-0.073
(0.09)
0.128**
(0.06)
-0.087
(0.10)
-0.162
(0.16)
0.025
(0.06)
0.089
(0.12)
0.076**
(0.04)
0.013
(0.01)
0.147**
(0.07)
0.039***
(0.01)
0.074
(0.12)
0.691*
(0.38)
357
0.639
669.358***

GDP/capita
(GDP/capita) squared
Government spending
Agriculture’s share
Population
Education
Trade share
ToT volatility
Ex. Concentration Index
Private credit share
Private credit share squared
FDI share
Inflation volatility
Productivity volatility (AGR)
Productivity volatility (IND)
Productivity volatility (SERV)
Rule of Law
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2
F Statistic
Note:

Model (6)
0.538***
(0.06)
0.451**
(0.20)
-0.075
(0.05)
0.105
(0.09)
0.673**
(0.33)
0.174
(0.33)
-0.171
(0.18)
-0.1
(0.07)
0.056
(0.05)
-0.029
(0.09)
-0.017
(0.14)
-0.015
(0.05)
0.035
(0.13)
0.028
(0.03)
0.014
(0.01)
0.110*
(0.06)
0.036***
(0.01)
0.032
(0.08)
1.167***
(0.40)
357
0.639
669.358***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Figure A1. Correlation between growth volatility and log of initial per capita GDP level

Figure A2. Correlation between growth volatility and export concentration index

Figure A3. Correlation between growth volatility and the size of private credit
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Figures A4 (upper left), A5 (upper right), and A6 (lower center).
The correlation between agricultural, industrial, and service productivity fluctuations
and growth volatility
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Figures A7 (left) and A8 (right). The correlation between governing indices and growth volatility
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